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I. INTRODUCTION
To compete for qualified personnel, an increasing number of
companies are offering severance packages as an employee benefit. In a
1997 survey, the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported that thirty-six percent of all medium and large private
companies have a formal policy regarding structured payments payable to
employees in the event that their employment is terminated through no
fault of their own.1 Although a majority of those packages are exclusively
available to executive-level employees, similar, albeit less lucrative,
packages are being offered to many corporate employees.3 For example,
forty-eight percent of the companies included in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' study responded that severance packages are offered to
employees who are involved in professional, technical, or related fields.4
Moreover, forty-three percent of employers replied that clerical and sales
staff are afforded similar protection.5 Perhaps most surprisingly, twenty-
six percent of employers extend employment benefits that include some
form of severance package to their blue-collar and service-field
employees.6 Although severance packages benefit employees who are
protected in the event that their position is terminated due to circumstances
beyond their control, the corporate motives underlying their increased use
are not entirely altruistic. These severance packages allow employers not
only to attract more qualified personnel, but also to minimize the risk
associated with wrongful termination lawsuits.7
One circumstance where employees are certain to look to their
severance benefits packages for protection is when a reduction of the
employer's workforce is necessitated by economic restraints placed upon
1. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997 (1999), available at 1.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN
MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997 (1999), available at
http://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news,.release/ebs3txt [hereinafter BLS Study].
2. Debbie Strickland, More Executives Negotiate Golden Parachutes Up Front,
ATLANTA Bus. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2000, at 11.
3. Packages to upper-echelon executives often include one to three times their base
yearly salary including bonuses. Id. Further, in a marked change from the mergers and
acquisitions boom in the late 1980's, these packages are no longer contingent upon a change
of corporate control or ownership. Id.; see also infra note 17 and accompanying text.
4. BLS Study, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. For additional reasons that
employers chose to award severance packages to employees, see infra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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the company . This is particularly true when the company is operating as a
debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code ("the
Code").9 As one court noted, "[t]he purpose of [Chapter 11] is to provide a
debtor with the legal protection necessary to give it the opportunity to
reorganize, and thereby to provide creditors with going-concern value
rather than the possibility of a more meager satisfaction of outstanding
debts through liquidation."'' 0  Therefore, throughout a Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession must develop the most valuable
company possible to enhance the return to its creditors and to increase the
opportunity for the reorganization of its business." In most cases, this
requires the debtor-in-possession to maintain an effective workforce.
Paradoxically, because a debtor-in-possession must maximize the value of
the estate for the benefit of its creditors," it will often be required to
evaluate the employees it wishes to retain considering the budgetary
constraints placed upon it by either the court or the trustee. As many
employees who are "protected" under severance plans have discovered,
however, lucrative severance packages may become "paper tigers" in the
event of their employer's bankruptcy.
This article will begin by providing background information about the
nature of severance pay. Next, it will examine the components of standard
termination clauses in employment contracts. The discussion of
termination clauses will emphasize the ability of a debtor-in-possession to
either reduce an employee's salary or to completely eliminate a position
due to adverse economic circumstances impacting the company. Also, this
article will consider whether such a termination is "for cause" within the
meaning of the employment contract and under common law. This article
will then turn to the disparate treatment that severance packages have
received in bankruptcy cases. It will focus specifically on the executory
8. This article will only address the validity of a discharge premised upon economic
hardship of the employer as a tangential issue. See infra Part II.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000). A debtor-in-possession is a "debtor except when a
person that has qualified under § 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case." Id. at §
1101. Section 1108 of the Code authorizes the corporate debtor to operate the corporation
throughout the reorganization process as a debtor-in-possession. Id. at § 1108.
10. Canadian Pac. Forest Prods. Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson Group, Inc.), 66
F.3d 1436, 1442 (6th Cir. 1995).
11. In re BMW Group I, 168 B.R. 731, 736-37 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994) (quoting
Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9 (1991)).
12. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985);
Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 246 (5th Cir. 1988). This
choice is obviated in the event that the reorganization fails and the company is forced to
liquidate under Chapter 7. In such a situation, all of the company's employees who are not
essential to the winding-up and eventual dissolution of the business would be discharged.
Notwithstanding the logistical distinctions between a Chapter 11 and a corporate liquidation,
the treatment of severance packages in the two situations is similar.
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nature of the obligations created under severance clauses and the
concomitant ability of a debtor-in-possession to reject employment
agreements containing a clause providing for severance pay, as well as the
ability of an employee to collect severance pay as an administrative
expense. After discussing the various approaches that courts have taken in
determining the priority afforded to severance packages under the Code,
this article will conclude by recommending that courts eschew the
traditional rationale underlying their decisions and adopt an approach that
is more flexible, equitable, and consonant with the changing nature of
severance packages.
II. CONTRACTUAL SEVERANCE PACKAGES AND TERMINATION CLAUSES
A. The Nature of Severance Packages
What constitutes a "severance package" is a rather amorphous concept
because companies offer different benefits to different employees. As
such, it is not surprising that courts have failed to reach an agreement
regarding the treatment of severance packages in the event that the
employer files bankruptcy and as to the reason that severance packages are
offered to employees. 3 Generally speaking, however, and for the purposes
of this article, a "severance package" is "in essence[,] a form of
compensation for the termination of the employment relation[ship], for
reasons other than the displaced employees' [sic] misconduct, primarily to
alleviate the consequent need for economic readjustment but also to
recompense him for certain losses attributable to the dismissal."' 4 It is "a
means of recompense for the economic exigencies and privations and
detriments resulting from the permanent separation of the employee from
service for no fault of his own. In a real sense it is remuneration for the
service provided during the period covered by the agreement."' 5 Severance
13. Notwithstanding the number of reasons that a severance package could be offered to
an employee, courts have been rather narrow-minded with respect to exactly what severance
packages are designed to do. See sources cited note 165 infra.
14. Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 120 A.2d 737, 740 (N.J. 1956). But see
Bolta Prods. Div. v. Dir. of the Div. of Employment Sec., 255 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Mass.
1970) (noting that under Massachusetts law, "severance pay" is "a payment to an employee
at the time of his separation in recognition and consideration of the past services he has
performed for the employer and the amount is usually based on the number of years of
service"). Although some sources give a broader definition of "severance pay," for the
purposes of this article, the application of the term will be limited to those contingent upon
termination of employment. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining "severance pay" as "[mioney ... paid by an employer to a dismissed employee ").
15. Adams, 120 A.2d at 740 (quoting Owens v. Press Publ'g Co., 120 A.2d 442, 445
(N.J. 1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d
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pay has "other objectives, such as the necessity of developing new skills
and the readjusting of the employee's life to altered circumstances ....
It... contributes much to the maintenance of the good will of employees
and the community generally."'
16
An employee's entitlement to such payments can arise from a myriad
of circumstances, the most publicized of which is the so-called "golden
parachute" paid to upper-echelon corporate executives in the event of a
change in corporate control. 7 In contrast to "golden parachutes," middle
management and lower-level employees often receive "silver" or "tin"
parachutes, providing them with some lesser degree of protection."' Aside
from the merger and acquisition context, severance packages can be found
in formal employment agreements between a single employee and
employer,' 9 in collective bargaining agreements between union members
and their employers, in formal company policies,2' and in statutes
88, 97 (Tenn. 1999) (opining that "[t]he reason for severance pay is to offset the employee's
monetary losses attributable to the dismissal from employment and to recompense the
employee for any period of time when he or she is out of work") (internal footnotes omitted)
(citing Bradwell v. GAF Corp, 954 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also 27 AM. JUR. 2D
Employment Relationship § 70 (1996). The Guiliano court noted that such "monetary
losses" may include "seniority rights, pension recovery, and re-training costs or other
burdens associated with obtaining new employment." Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 97 n.6.
16. Adams, 120 A.2d at 741.
17. "A 'golden parachute' is a provision in an executive's contract that provides for
payment in the event of termination or a defined loss in status after a defined change in
control of the company." In re Crystal Apparel, Inc., 220 B.R. 816, 821 n.2 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998). See, e.g., Calvin Trillin, Deep Pocket, Short Reach, TIME, Jan. 13, 1997, at
24 (discussing Michael Ovitz's $90 million severance package).
18. This article will only focus upon severance packages triggered by termination of
employment and not those severance packages triggered by changes of control.
19. See, e.g., Dullanty v. Selectors, Inc. (In re Selectors, Inc.), 85 B.R. 843 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1988); In re Phones for All, Inc., 249 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000); In re DeMert
& Dougherty, Inc., No. 96-B-00851, 1999 WL 1140859, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
1999); In re Comm. Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 B.R. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ok. 1999); Campo Elecs.,
Inc. v. Ross (In re Campo Elecs., Inc.), 247 B.R. 646 (D. La. 1998); In re Crystal Apparel,
Inc., 220 B.R. at 816; In re Bryant Universal Roofing, Inc. 218 B.R. 948 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1998); In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 193 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re
Jamesway Corp., 199 B.R. 836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear,
Inc., 197 B.R. 771 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Wang Labs., Inc., 154 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1993); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group), 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 145 B.R.
138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992);
In re Uly-Pak, Inc., 128 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991); In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 89
B.R. 980 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Rawson Food Servs., Inc., 61 B.R. 207 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1986).
20. See, e.g., In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1992); Teamsters Local No.
310 v. Ingrum (In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co., Inc.), 789 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1986); Lines v.
Sys. Bd. of Adjustment No. 94 Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks (In re Health Maint.
Found.), 680 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3 Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers (In re Straus-Duparquet, Inc.), 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967); Arabian
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mandating their payment in certain specified circumstances.22
B. Termination Clauses in Employment Contracts
Almost every formal employment contract contains some variety of a
termination clause which sets forth the rights of both the employer and
employee. In most employment contracts, the employer will reserve the
right to terminate the agreement at any time "for cause" or without "cause."
The distinction between discharge "for cause" and discharge absent
"cause" is crucial, as severance pay is often conditioned upon the
occurrence of the latter. 3 Thus, what constitutes "cause" under either the
employment contract or under common law is the entry point for any
analysis of an employee's right to severance pay.
However, before discussing the enforceability of termination clauses
in employment contracts, it is perhaps helpful to provide a brief overview
of the employment law concepts involved. Employment contracts can be
divided into two categories: (1) contracts for an indefinite term and (2)
24contracts for a definite term. The law regarding termination is well-
settled. Whereas an employment contract for an indefinite term is a
contract at-will and may be terminated by either party at any time, "a
contract for a definite term may not be terminated before the end of the
v. Coleman (In re Ad Serv. Engraving Co.), 338 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1964); In re Pub. Ledger,
161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947); Teamsters Indus. Sec. Fund v. World Sales, Inc. (In re World
Sales, Inc.), 183 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In re St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 86 B.R.
606 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 75 BR. 854 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987); In re United Dep't Stores, Inc., 49 B.R. 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re
Cott Corp., 47 B.R. 487 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re B. Kessler, Inc., 23 B.R. 722 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., 5 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21. See, e.g., Northwest Eng'g Co. v. United Steelworkers of America (In re Northwest
Eng'g Co.), 863 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1988); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth
Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976); Roeder v. United Steelworkers of Am. (In re Old
Electralloy Corp.), 167 B.R. 786 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors Metalsource Corp. v. U.S. Metalsource Corp. (In re U.S. Metalsource Corp.), 163
B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993); In re Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc., 136 B.R. 410
(D.S.C. 1992); Jeannette Corp. v. Gilardi (In re Jeannette Corp.), 118 B.R. 327 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990).
22. In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 213 B.R. 401 (Bankr. M.D. Ha. 1997); In re Maiden
Mills, Inc., 45 B.R. 408 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). A separate, yet related, issue is the
treatment of withdrawal liability under an employment contribution plan. See text
accompanying note 146 infra.
23. Some employment contracts also stipulate that the employer is required to give the
employee a requisite amount of notice if the employee's position is terminated. In some
cases, the employee's entitlement to severance pay is contingent upon the employer not
giving the amount of notice provided for in the employment contract. See, e.g., Part III.B. 1.
In other cases, the availability of severance pay is not conditioned either upon whether
notice is given timely or whether notice is given at all. See id.
24. Little v. Fed. Container Corp., 452 S.W.2d 875, 877-78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).
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term, except for cause or by mutual agreement, unless the right to do so is
reserved in the contract., 25 Within this statement of the law, two separate
situations are addressed. The "except for cause" language is applicable in
situations where the employer's reason for terminating the employee is
justified as "for cause" pursuant to the interpretation of the term as it has
developed via common law. Conversely, the qualification, "unless the
right to do so is reserved in the contract," addresses situations where the
contract contains a termination clause specifying acts or omissions that
constitute "cause" as per the language of the employment contract itself.
The two situations, however, are not mutually exclusive because "[t]he fact
that the contract of employment authorizes the employer to terminate [the
employee] for certain specified causes does not necessarily prevent the
employer from discharging the employee for a cause not so specified. 26
Accordingly, where a court is called upon to determine the propriety of an
employer's decision to discharge an employee with whom the employer
has entered into a valid employment contract, the court must look not only
to the employment agreement itself, but also to common law.
1. "Cause" as Defined by the Employment Contract
A majority of employment contracts contain a list of enumerated
circumstances that constitute "cause" for terminating an employee. These
so-called "bad boy" clauses-or where they govern the employee's post-
termination activities, "golden handcuffs"-vary from the extremely specific
to the overly broad often within each individual contract. These lists allow
an employer to terminate the employee without notice and, oftentimes,
without any severance pay. Typically, grounds for termination include
work-related bases such as failure to meet agreed upon performance goals,
failure to abide by established company policies, or failure to comply with
established company procedures. Furthermore, many employment
contracts contain provisions governing the employee's activities outside the
office and provide that the employee's conviction for any felony, any crime
involving fraud or dishonesty, or any act abhorrent to the community-at-
large constitutes "cause" for discharge. Some agreements do not even
require a conviction and, instead, dictate that a reasonable suspicion that
the employee has committed such acts is grounds for termination. It is also
commonplace for the employment contract to contain a "blanket" provision
providing the company with the discretion to terminate the employee
25. Id. (emphasis added). If the employment is for a definite duration then it is implied
by law that, even if not explicitly stated, the employee can only be discharged for good or
just cause. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Mich.
1980) (footnote omitted).
26. 56 C.J.S., Master & Servant, § 42(a) (1985).
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because of any other act or omission by the employee that the company
deems to be "for cause."
These so-called "blanket" provisions are the most problematic in
practice because of the ambiguity, breadth and, thus, discretion afforded to
the company in its determination of what constitutes "cause" for
termination under the employment agreement.2 7 For example, one way in
which these discretionary provisions could be employed is to justify
termination of personnel due to fiscal constraints placed upon the company.
It is certainly true that most well-drafted employment contracts will make
clear that the enumerated grounds for "termination for cause" are
illustrative rather than exclusive, but only in rare cases should a "blanket"
clause allow an employer to terminate an employee "for cause" because of
28the economic condition of the company. When called upon to resolve
issues concerning the interpretation of a contract, courts should attempt "to
ascertain the intention of the parties based upon the usual, natural, and
ordinary meaning of the contractual language., 29 An examination of most
employment contracts will demonstrate that termination clauses act as a
sanction against actions of the employee. It is, therefore, unlikely that a
discretionary provision within a termination clause is intended to operate as
a blanket authorization to render an employee's termination as one "for
cause" in a situation where the reasons for the discharge have nothing to do
with the actions of the employee, but rather, are the result of the economic
considerations of the employer.3 °
27. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895 (stating that "[a] promise to terminate
employment for cause only would be illusory if the employer were permitted to be the sole
judge and final arbiter of the propriety of the discharge"); accord Sanders v. Parker Drilling
Co., 911 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1990); Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d
1050, 1056 (Alaska 1986).
28. The anomalous case where the language of the employment agreement may support
a conclusion that economic reasons constitute "cause" for termination would be if the
employment agreement either specifically provided that such circumstances constitute
"cause" or if the contract contained language in the termination clause allowing termination
because of actions of the employer as opposed to the employee. It should be noted,
however, that such an inclusion in an employment contract would be highly irregular.
29. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). See also Bob Pearsall
Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975).
30. A tangential issue, but one which has a similar solution, is where the employment
contract contains a salary modification clause, pursuant to which the employer has the
discretion either to raise or reduce an employee's base salary because the employer deems
such an adjustment to be in the best interests of the company in light of the company's
overall financial condition. If such a clause is invoked merely to reduce an employee's
salary, then the action will likely be upheld if challenged. If, however, the clause is invoked
to reduce an employee's salary to such a point where the employee is constructively
discharged, then it is likely that a court would find that the employer's implementation of
the clause is a violation of the contract. This conclusion is reinforced by the cannon of
contractual interpretation that "[aill provisions in the contract should be construed in
harmony with each other, if possible, to promote consistency and to avoid repugnancy
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2. "Cause" as Defined Under Common Law
Because most employment contracts do not limit "cause" to the
specific acts or omissions enumerated within the agreement, courts should
look to judicial decisions to determine whether the employee's termination
was "for cause" under common law.31 The acts and omissions that
constitute "just cause" for termination under common law often mirror
those contained in employment contracts; therefore, the problematic aspect
of the common law definition of "just cause" arises in situations where
employees are discharged pursuant to the power afforded employers via
discretionary "blanket provisions." In situations where the employment
contract specifically provides that severance packages are contingent upon
discharge "without cause," there can be little doubt that any denial of
benefits to the employee is based upon the validity of that contract.
Likewise, in situations where the employee is terminated because of
reasons not specifically enumerated in the employment agreement, the
ability of an employer to deny severance benefits to the employee is also
based upon the validity of the contract. Thus, the difficulty in judicial
application of the common law decisions addressing the propriety of a
discharge is that those decisions are not premised upon the enforcement of
the employment contract, but rather upon the employer's breach of the
contract, which, in turn, has given rise to a wrongful discharge action by
the employee.
This contradistinction can be illustrated by a truncated survey of the
judicial decisions addressing the issue of whether the adverse economic
circumstances can constitute "just cause" for termination where the
employment contract at issue did not specify that "economic reasons" were
cause for termination. For example, in Boynton v. TRW, Inc. ,32 the Sixth
Circuit held that a "plaintiff's discharge for economic reasons, as
determined by and within the complete discretion of the board of directors
of the... corporation, constitutes termination for sufficient cause."" The
court reasoned that "[t]he [employment] agreement empowered the board
of directors to terminate the plaintiff's employment for sufficient cause.
The determination as to what constituted sufficient cause was left to the
between the various provisions of a single contract." Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 95. Where a
salary modification clause is viewed in conjunction with a termination clause within the
same contract, it is clear that to allow the employee's salary to be reduced to such a point
where it results in constructive termination would enable the employer to undermine the
security afforded the employee under the termination clause of the employment agreement
and vitiate the operation of the termination clause in its entirety.
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
32. 858 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1988).
33. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
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board's discretion. 34 The court further reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise
would impose an unworkable economic burden upon employers to stay in
business to the point of bankruptcy in order to satisfy employment
contracts and related agreements terminable only for good and sufficient
cause."
35
The cases addressing the issue of whether economic reasons constitute
"cause" for termination of an employment relationship have arisen in the
context of plaintiffs' assertions that they have been wrongfully discharged
by their employers in breach of their respective employment contracts.
Thus, the application of those decisions to cases where employees are
attempting to enforce their employment contracts in order to obtain the
severance benefits provided within them proves to be problematic. The
crux of this difficulty is that courts are in disagreement as to the nature of
severance. Some courts and commentators have concluded that
"[s]everance pay.., serves as a liquidated damages clause, compensating
an employee for the breach of an agreement .... As a liquidated damages
clause, severance pay substitutes for post-breach calculations of loss in
individual cases. 36 Other courts have concluded, however, that "severance
34. Id.
35. Id. The Sixth Circuit cited several cases as supporting its conclusion that economic
reasons constitute "just cause" for termination of an employment relationship. See id. at
1183-84. Arguably, however, only one of those cases actually supports the proposition for
which it is cited by the court. Compare Friske v. Jasinski Builders, 402 N.W.2d 42, 46
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[clase law indicates that termination of the
employment of an otherwise competent employee due to an economically motivated
business closing is not grounds for a wrongful discharge claim") with F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Hall, 68 F.2d 533, 535 (4th Cir. 1934) (concluding that a contract for lifetime
employment is contingent upon the business remaining viable) and Sahadi v. Reynolds
Chem., 636 F.2d 1116, 1118 (6th Cir. 1980) (opining that, where a former employee was
asserting an age discrimination claim against a business, a showing by the employer that the
employee was actually discharged for economic reasons was sufficient to refute the age
discrimination claim).
In addition, the conclusion that any termination that is not a consequence of the an act
or omission on the employee is for "just cause" is difficult to reconcile with the majority of
judicial decisions addressing the issue. See e.g., 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 49
(1970) (noting that "in order to justify dismissal of one employed for a specific period, [an
employer] must be able to show a breach on the part of the employee") (emphasis added);
56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 42(a) (1985) ("As a general proposition, any act of the servant
which injures or has a tendency to injure his master's business, interests, or reputation will
justify the dismissal of the servant.") (emphasis added). Indeed, if an employer could
discharge an employee for almost any reason pursuant to the power and discretion granted
to it under a blanket termination clause, then the operation of all clauses allowing for
severance payments would be entirely vitiated, as any discharge could be deemed "for
cause" under common law.
36. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. The Okonite Co., 189 F.3d 339, 346-47 (3d Cir.
1999) (Rosen, J., dissenting); Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1993); Westport
Bank & Trust Corp. v. Geraghty, 865 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Conn. 1994); Wanhope v. Press
Co., 10 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (N.Y. 1939); Ralph Weber, Severance Pay, Sales of Assets, and
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pay is a form of compensation paid by an employer to an employee at a
time when the employment relationship is terminated."37
The distinction between the two characterizations is of great
importance because of its effects upon the priority afforded to these
payments under §§ 502 and 507 of the Code.38 However, in the context of
employment law, the distinction may be inconsequential. On one hand, if
the severance payments are classified as liquidated damages, then the
judicial decisions addressing "cause" in the context of wrongful discharge
claims are relevant and, perhaps, controlling in a case where an employer
asserts that its discharge of an employee for economic reasons was a
discharge "for cause." Notwithstanding, it appears that employees would
still be entitled to severance pay, but it would be paid to the employee
under the guise of liquidated damages for the wrongful discharge.3 9
If, on the other hand, the severance payments are classified as part of
the employee's compensation package, then those cases addressing "cause"
in the context of a wrongful discharge action would be inapplicable to an
action to recover severance payments in a situation where the employee is
discharged for economic reasons. As stated by the Third Circuit in In re
Public Ledger:
The cases [cited] ... do not involve severance pay contractual
provisions but rather damages for alleged breaches of contracts of
employment. The claims in those cases were based on the theory
that a collective bargaining agreement amounted to a promise by
the employer to furnish each member of the contracting union
employment for the term of the contract .... In the instant case
the claims are not for damages for breaching the contract. . . , but
rather for severance pay, which accrued under the contract when
they [the union members] lost their jobs through the business
management's act of shutting 
the business down.
This distinction, therefore, could lead a court to conclude that-
although economic reasons may indeed be "good cause" for termination in
the context of a wrongful discharge claim-an economic justification for
discharge does not relieve an employer of its contractual duty to pay
severance benefits to its employees.4'
the Resolution of Omitted Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 597 (1982).
37. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W. 2d 88, 97 (Tenn. 1999); accord Office & Prof'l
Employees Int'l Union v. FDIC, 27 F.3d 598, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
38. See id. 1 I U.S.C. §§ 502, 507 (1994); see also infra Part III.A.4. (discussing the
priority afforded severance packages in bankruptcy).
39. It is important to note that an employee's entitlement to the severance package is
often conditioned upon the employee releasing the employer from any further claims
relating to the employment relationship.
40. 161 F.2d 762, 772-73 (3d Cir. 1947) (citations omitted).
41. A danger is always present in such a characterization, however, as a court could
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At this point, this article will assume that the employee is entitled to
the severance benefits provided for in the employment contract and, thus,
will shift focus to the treatment the severance packages will receive under
the Bankruptcy Code.
III. SEVERANCE PAY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
An employment contract is a contract and, thus, by definition,
"bestows on those party to it certain rights in exchange for which they
taken on certain obligations. 42 These rights and obligations are reciprocal
in nature, in that the rights of one party to the contract are the obligations of
the other and vice-versa. Both the rights and obligations incident to its
contracts follow a Chapter 11 debtor into its bankruptcy pursuant to §
541(a) of the Code, which creates an estate consisting of "all legal and
equitable interests of the debtor in property," regardless of location or
possession.43  The legislative history underlying § 541(a) indicates the
broad scope of the provision," and the Supreme Court has effectuated
Congressional intent by interpreting § 541(a) as encompassing "all kinds of
property," including not only tangible, but also intangible property.45
Because contractual rights are a form of intangible property, those rights
are included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate.46
construe the employee's entitlement to severance payments as compensation for discharge
"absent cause." The court could then look to the case law stating that economic reasons
constitute "cause" for termination and conclude that the employee is not entitled to
severance benefits.
Such a ruling, however, would vest employers with the discretionary power to vitiate
any severance payments to which an employee may be entitled by merely giving an
economic justification for the employee's dismissal. This conclusion would undermine the
reasons for severance packages in general. See supra notes 7 and 16 and accompanying text
(setting forth the reasons businesses offer severance packages to employees). Furthermore,
the policy underlying the Sixth Circuit's rationale for allowing economic reasons to
constitute "just cause" for termination, see supra note 35 and accompanying text, would not
be effectuated by denying severance benefits where the employee was discharged for
economic reasons post-petition.
42. Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); see, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2D,
Contracts, § 18 (1991); 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 1(2) (1963).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994). Section 541(b) and 541(c)(2) of the Code contain
exceptions to this general rule, pursuant to which certain property is specifically excluded
from the bankruptcy estate. See id. at § 541(b), (c)(2).
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367, 367 (1977).
45. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204, 205 (1983).
46. In re Chateauguay Corp., 116 B.R. 887, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). This
conclusion was expressly reiterated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re
Computer Communications., Inc. See 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987). In In re Computer
Communications, the creditor unilaterally terminated a contract with the debtor pursuant to a
bankruptcy default clause and argued that because executory contracts are not property of
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A. Executory Contracts-A General Overview
From the debtor's perspective, the upshot of a contract being classified
as property of its estate under § 541(a) is that the trustee47 has the power to
assume or reject that contract if it is executory in nature.a  The provisions
of § 365 of the Code govern the assumption or rejection of an executory
contract.49  Specifically, § 365(a) permits assumption or rejection of
executory contracts and unexpired leases,50 and § 365(b) conditions the
ability to assume or reject upon adequate assurance that the debtor-in-
possession will promptly cure any default in the contract or lease,5'
compensate the non-debtor party for any pecuniary loss resulting from the
default,52 and continue to perform pursuant to the terms of the contract in
the future.
53
1. The Debtor-in-Possession's Ability to Reject Executory
Contracts
The purpose of the doctrine of rejection is "to enable bankruptcy
estate fiduciaries to free the estates under their control from the onerous
obligations of executory contracts and leases. 54 As the Sixth Circuit has
noted:
The legislative purpose underlying § 70b [the predecessor to §
the estate, the automatic stay did not bar its termination of the contract. Id. at 726. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and held that the bankruptcy estate included the
contract "despite non-assignability or the existence of a bankruptcy default clause." Id. at
730.
47. In the context of a Chapter 11 case, the debtor-in-possession possesses the same
powers as the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 1106(a) (1994). Accordingly, this article
will employ these two terms interchangeably.
48. See In re Taylor, 103 B.R. 511,515 (D.N.J. 1989).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
50. Section 365(a) of the Code states in full that "[except as provided in sections 765
and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to
the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor." Id. at § 365(a).
51. Id. at § 365(b)(1).
52. Id. at § 365(b)(2).
53. Id. at § 365(b)(3).
54. CASC Corp. v. Milner (In re Locke), 180 B.R. 245, 260 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995);
accord Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987)
("The statutory purpose of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to enable the trustee to assume
those executory contracts which are beneficial to the estate while rejecting those which are
onerous or burdensome to perform."); In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 190 B.R. 741, 746
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that one significance of a debtor-in-possession's ability to
reject an assumed executory contract is that "it ... relieves the estate of onerous and
burdensome future obligations").
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365] was to solve the problem of assumption of liabilities, i.e.,
excusing or requiring future specific performance by the
bankrupt .... [W]hat § 70b actually proposed to do was to
secure this continued mutuality [of obligation and performance]
wherever it was felt to be of greater benefit to the estate to
proceed in accordance with the bankruptcy debtor's plans rather
than to freeze his commercial relations as of the filing date.55
a. Rejection of General Employment Contracts
Most courts apply the "business judgment test ' 56 to determine whether
a debtor-in-possession is permitted to reject an executory contract.57
Pursuant to this test, "[a] court will approve the rejection of an executory
contract... if rejection would benefit the debtor's estate.' ', s Admittedly,
the business judgment rule affords corporate directors broad discretion in
determining whether to assume or reject executory contracts,59 and
bankruptcy courts will routinely defer to the decision of the debtor-in-
possession after a perfunctory review of the facts.60 Thus, motions to reject
are seldom denied.6'
b. Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements
In contrast to general executory contracts, which are governed by §
365 of the Code, the treatment of collective bargaining agreements upon
55. Leasing Serv. Corp., 826 F.2d at 436-37 (quoting 2 Collier On Bankruptcy
365.01[2] (15th ed. 1987)) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56. Under the "business judgment test," courts are hesitant to interfere with corporate
governance and generally defer to the decisions of the corporate directors. Lubrizol Enters.,
Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Lubrizol Enters.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th
Cir. 1985). Transposed to the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the decision to
reject an executory contract will be accepted by courts unless the creditor can demonstrate
that the debtor-in -possession's decision was made "in bad faith or in gross abuse of its
business discretion." Id. It is important to note that the debtor-in-possession will carry the
ultimate burden of proof with respect to the issue of whether rejection would benefit the
bankruptcy estate. In re Sun City Invests., Inc., 89 B.R. 245, 248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
57. See, e.g., In re Lubrizol Enters. 756 F.2d at 1046; Bourman's Inc. v. Allied
Supermarkets, Inc., 706 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 B.R. 949,
956 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp., 15 BR. 990, 995
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981); In re Marina Enters., 14 B.R. 327, 330 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
58. In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 B.R. at 956.
59. See generally Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1979); Polin v.
Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 (8th Cir. 1977).
60. In re Sun City Invests. 89 B.R. at 248.
61. But see In re Ron Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (denying a
motion to reject an executory contract where the court felt that the bankruptcy petition was
filed in bad faith).
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the filing of a Chapter 11 petition is governed by § 1113 of the Code.62
Section 1113 permits a debtor-in-possession to assume or reject a collective
bargaining agreement, but only if the debtor-in-possession acts in
63accordance with the requirements of the provision. Whereas subsections
(b) and (d) provide the procedural requirements,64 subsection (c) sets forth
the burden of proof the debtor-in-possession must carry in order for a court
to permit rejection of this specific type of employment contract. 65  It is
important to note, however, that the burden of proof placed upon the
debtor-in-possession is much more stringent than the business-judgment
66test which applies to general employment contracts. Not only does the
debtor-in-possession have the burden of proving that the collective
bargaining agreement burdens the estate,67 but the debtor-in-possession
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
guarantees, inter alia, the rights of union employees to organize, bargain collectively and to
strike, is codified at title 29 of the United States Code. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) contains requirements with which an employer must
comply where it either modifies or terminates such an agreement.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a).
64. Subsection (b) contains extrajudicial requirements such as providing an authorized
representative of the union with the proposed modifications to the collective bargaining
agreement, with assurances that all affected parties are being treated fairly and equitably,
and with any information needed to evaluate the information contained in the proposal. 11
U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(l). Furthermore, the debtor-in-possession is required to meet regularly
with the authorized representative to effectuate the modification of the agreements. Id. at §
1113 (b)(2).
Subsection (b) provides for the extrajudicial procedure. In contrast, subsection (d)
sets forth the procedural guidelines. See id. at § 1113(d). Subject to permissive extensions,
the bankruptcy court is required not only to conduct a hearing within fourteen days after the
date upon which the debtor-in-possession filed its motion to reject, but also to rule on the
motion within thirty days after the date upon which the hearing is commenced. Id.
65. See id. at§ 1113(c).
66. The United States Supreme Court recognized and applied this more stringent
standard in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), reasoning that such
agreements create a "law of the shop" and, thus, promote peaceful labor practices. Id. at
520. For the Supreme Court's discussion of the requirements, see id. at 521-22.
67. In converse phraseology, the trustee or debtor-in-possession must demonstrate that
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would benefit the estate. Obviously, to
varying degrees, all executory contracts will burden the estate. The trustee or debtor-in-
possession, therefore, must come forth with evidence demonstrating more than merely a
burden. Id. However, courts generally do not require proof that the reorganization will fail
absent rejection. Id. A sufficient burden to warrant rejection of collective bargaining
agreements has been evidenced where the debtor-in-possession has established that the
agreements imposed restrictive work environments, thus increasing costs and reducing both
efficiency and competitiveness. See, e.g., In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 B.R. 343, 351
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (concluding that collective bargaining agreement was burdensome
where the debtor's wage costs were 10-14% greater than the industry standard). Similarly,
in In re Rath Packing Co., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Iowa concluded that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement was beneficial to the
debtor's estate because such rejection would significantly reduce the debtor's health care
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must also demonstrate that it has complied with the extrajudicial
formalities of subsection (b),68 that the authorized representative has
refused to accept the proffered proposal "without good cause,' 69 and that
"the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of the agreement."7
Before the debtor-in-possession can make a motion either to assume
or reject pursuant to § 365(a) of the Code, however, the debtor-in-
possession must first demonstrate that the contract is indeed executory in
nature. Curiously, neither the Code nor the legislative history of § 365
contains a definition of "executory contract." The legislative history,
however, does contain a statement that an "executory contract" generally
includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on
both sides. 7' As a result of the congressional silence on the issue, two
approaches have developed as to what constitutes an executory contract.
2. The Countryman Approach
The first, and perhaps most well-established, approach to determining
whether a contract is executory in nature is the definition espoused by
Professor Vern Countryman in his two landmark articles published in the
University of Minnesota Law Review in the early 1970S.72 Under the
Countryman Approach, an executory contract is "a contract under which
the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are
so unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
costs. 36 B.R. 979, 991 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). It is also interesting to note that the
court, in balancing the equities involved pursuant to § 1113(c)(3), opined that rejection
benefited the employees as well because they were now free to obtain better health benefits
than the debtor could otherwise provide. Id.
68. Id. text accompanying note 64 (describing the extrajudicial formalities).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2).
70. Id. at § 11 13(c)(3). In balancing the respective equities, courts have looked to the
good or bad faith of the parties, see In re C & W Mining Co., 38 B.R. 496, 502-03 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984), the cost-spreading abilities of the parties, see In re Brada Miller Freight
Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 897-98 (1 1th Cir. 1983), and the possibility of liquidation in the
event that the motion to reject is denied, see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522;
In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d at 897-98; In re C & W Mining Co., 38 B.R.
at 502-03.
71. H.R. REP. No. 95-598, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 6303
(emphasis added).
72. See Vein Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L.
REv. 439 (1973) [hereinafter Part 1]; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part 11, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Part II]. The definition
espoused by Professor Countryman has been termed the "Countryman Approach" by courts
and scholars and has been referred to as "a godsend to judges perplexed by the strange
results they found in bankruptcy contract cases." Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227, 237 (1989).
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constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other., 73
In the context of employment agreements, the Countryman Approach
would lead to the result that the contract is executory in nature for one of
several reasons. The first, and perhaps most apparent reason is that if the
contract has not expired pursuant to its own terms as of the petition date,
then there is performance due on the part of both the employer and the
employee. Simply stated, the employer must continue to employ the
employee for the time period specified in the agreement, and the employee
must continue to perform his or her duties under the contract. The failure
of either party to do so would constitute a material breach of the contract.74
In a situation where the contract has expired according to its own terms, a
court may nonetheless find that the contract is executory based upon the
presence of a release clause within the contract, pursuant to which the
employee is required to release the employer from liability on claims
relating to the employment relationship upon receipt of the first installment
of the severance payments.75 Therefore, if the employee has yet to release
73. Countryman, Part I, supra note 73, at 460. Under both the Countryman Approach
and the "Functional Approach," see discussion supra Part I.A.2, "[t]he critical date for
determining the executory nature of a contract is the date on which the bankruptcy court
considers the debtor's application to assume or reject the contract," as opposed to the
petition date. Camp v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Gov't Sec. Corp.), 101 B.R. 343, 349
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); (citing In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 B.R. 949, 957 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984)) (emphasis added); accord Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984). Cf. In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 851
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting the validity of the Gloria Mfg. line of cases, but opining that
under the functional approach, "consideration must be given first to the obligations of the
parties at the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed rather than when the motion to
assume or reject was made.").
Thus, it is possible that a contract may be executory as of the petition date, but due to
circumstances that occur before the hearing date, the contract may no longer be executory in
nature as of the hearing date. An example of such a situation is where "the contract expired
by its own terms before the bankruptcy court considers the application to assume or reject
the contract." In re Gov't Sec. Corp., 101 B.R. at 349 (citing In re Pesce Baking Co., 43
B.R. at 957).
74. It can be surmised that many courts neglect to address the issue of whether the
employment contract is executory in nature because the conclusion is overtly clear based
upon this characteristic.
75. Indeed, many standard-form employment contracts condition the employee's
receipt of the severance payments upon the employee releasing the employer from any
claims based upon the scope of the employee's employment. The language of such a clause
may read, "Upon acceptance of the first installment of the Termination Fee, the Employee
releases and discharges the Company and its officers, directors, owners and agents of and
from any and all manner of liability relating to the Employee's employment with the
Company."
These release provisions are often unduly broad and will often encompass the release
of all employee rights to claims against the employer. Obviously, a release of any rights
which are already vested in favor of the employee, i.e., rights to benefits under ERISA-
qualified plans, would be unenforceable. Moreover, some employment agreements will
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the employer from liability, there is still material performance due on the
part of the employer and employee, in that the employer must pay the first
installment of the severance package due to the employee, who, upon
receipt and retention of the payment, impliedly releases the employer from
liability. From a practitioner's perspective, the continued mutuality of
obligation is important because it is necessary to overcome the general
proposition that "where the only performance obligation remaining under
the employment contracts is the payment of money, the contract will not be
found executory. 76
3. The Functional Approach
A second, albeit minority, approach employed by courts in
determining whether a contract is executory in nature is the "functional
approach," which looks not to the "mutuality of commitments" under the
contract, but rather to "the nature of the parties and the goals of
reorganization. 77  In analyzing contracts under the functional approach,
courts consider "the purpose behind allowing the debtor or trustee to
assume or reject a contract. 78  Consequently, the functional approach
requires courts to look first to the goals of § 365: "(1) taking advantage of
contain a provision under which the employer will release all claims against the employee,
including claims for theft that may not be discovered until after the employee has been
discharged and the employment contract has been performed in full.
76. In re Bryant Universal Roofing, Inc., 218 B.R. 948, 953 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998).
77. In re Gov't Sec. Corp., 101 B.R. 343, 347 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). The "functional
approach" was proposed by Professor Westbrook in A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts. See generally Westbrook, supra note 73, at 227. Westbrook's proposed
approach sought to remedy three common situations where the application of the
Countryman approach produces erroneous conclusions:
The first consists of cases concerned with whether particular contracts are
"executory" as a preliminary to determining whether rejection will be permitted.
The second consists of cases holding that when a contract is "executory" and is
rejected, the contract is somehow destroyed or otherwise altered. The third
category, an aggravated derivative of the second, is comprised of cases holding
that rejection of a contract somehow destroys a right in or to property created by
the contract, even if that right is otherwise good as against all competing
claimants and as against the estate itself.
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 845, 884 (1988). Notwithstanding the differences between the Countryman
and Functional approaches, this article will not focus upon the merits of the two distinct
approaches because the outcome is the same with respect to the treatment of employment
contracts regardless of the approach adopted by the jurisdiction. See supra notes 57 and 58
and accompanying text; infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing the conclusion
that most employment contracts would be considered executory in nature under not only the
Countryman approach, but also under the Functional approach).
78. In re Gov't Sec. Corp., 101 B.R. at 348.
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contracts which will benefit the estate;79 (2) relieving the estate of
burdensome contracts; (3) promoting the debtor's fresh start; (4) permitting
the allowance and determination of claims; and (5) preventing parties from
remaining in doubt concerning their status vis-a-vis the estate., 80 Next, the
court must determine whether those purposes have already been
accomplished in the bankruptcy case via another substantive or procedural
mechanism or whether they can be accomplished solely by the rejection of
the executory contract.8' If the court finds either that those purposes have
already been accomplished or that rejection would not effectuate those
purposes, then the functional approach dictates that the contract is not
executory within the meaning of § 365.82
As the Countryman approach would result in the conclusion that
employment contracts are executory in nature, so too would the functional
approach. As dictated by the United States Bankruptcy Court in In re
Bluman, a court applying the functional approach would look first to the
purposes of the debtor-in-possession's ability to reject executory
83 8contracts. Disregarding the first purpose, 4 rejection of an employment
agreement not only relieves the bankruptcy estate of a burdensome
contract, but also effectuates the fresh start of the debtor in its emergence
from an effective reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code. A Chapter
11 reorganization requires the debtor-in-possession to reevaluate many
aspects of its operation, the most obvious of which is its profitability. In an
effort to increase profits, a debtor-in-possession will often be compelled to
reduce costs, including labor costs. This compulsion may arise from the
demands of the creditors' committee during plan negotiations or from the
budgetary operating restraints placed upon it by either post-petition lenders
or the bankruptcy court presiding over its case. A debtor-in-possession has
79. The inclusion of a rationale for assumption is perhaps appropriate when considering
the purposes of § 365. It is puzzling, however, that the Bluman court would advocate the
consideration of the policy reasons underlying assumption in a situation where a debtor-in-
possession was attempting to reject the contract. Indeed, it is unclear as to how a
consideration of the policies supporting assumption would aid a court in determining a
debtor-in-possession's ability to reject an executory contract. It is not surprising, therefore,
that neither Bluman, nor any other court upon which the Bluman court relied has been able
to articulate a situation where the policies underlying assumption would be beneficial to a
court applying the functional approach to a debtor-in-possession's motion to reject. See In
re Bluman 125 B.R. at 363; see, e.g., In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978); In re
Monument Record Corp., 61 B.R. 866, 868-69 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Norquist,
43 B.R. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. D. Wash. 1984).
80. In re Bluman 125 B.R. at 363 (citation omitted in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81. Id. (other citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 79 (commenting on the puzzling inclusion of the
assumption rationale).
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an affirmative duty to maximize the value of its bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of its creditors," and the rejection of certain employment contracts
can enable the debtor to reorganize effectively.86 Furthermore, allowing a
debtor-in-possession to reject an employment contract permits the
determination and administration of claims against the estate and does so in
an efficient manner. As will be discussed in Part III.A.4 supra, the
rejection of employment contracts will facilitate the filings of proofs of
claim against the employer on account of the rejected contracts.
87
Consequently, the presiding bankruptcy court will be provided an
opportunity to administer these claims, and the terminated employees will
be apprised of their status as unsecured creditors of their former employer's
bankruptcy estate.
Next, a court applying the functional approach would determine
whether these goals could be effectuated by another mechanism provided
for in the Code and whether rejection would help facilitate these goals in
light of the particular facts of the case before it. In the context of
employment agreements, no other bankruptcy provision would enable the
debtor-in-possession to reduce costs and increase profitability in a manner
equivalent to that allowed by § 365. Although there are specific fact
patterns that could lead a court to conclude that rejection would not
facilitate the purposes underlying rejection, those cases would likely be the
exception and not the rule.8
85. Admittedly, the maximization of the bankruptcy estate is not as prevalent in a
Chapter 11 as would be the case if the debtor was in liquidation. Notwithstanding, the
debtor-in-possession does have an obligation to preserve the assets of its bankruptcy estate,
Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1989), which may require the debtor to cut
expenses in order to free-up funding for maintenance of, and insurance coverage on, its hard
assets. Moreover, the return for the creditors will almost certainly be greater if the debtor-
in-possession can reorganize. Thus, allowing the debtor to cut expenses in order to
effectuate a plan of reorganization not only furthers the fresh start policy of the Code, but
also is consonant with one of the principal reasons for Chapter 11, which is to enhance
return to the creditors. See generally In re BMW Group I, Ltd., 168 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr.
W.D. Ok. 1994); supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
86. An interesting issue that could arise in the context of a debtor-in-possession's
motion either to assume or reject an employment contract under § 365 is whether the debtor
can reject certain contracts and assume others in a situation where the contracts are
interrelated. Although courts have yet to address this argument in the context of
employment agreements, it is foreseeable that an employer may desire to reject certain
employment contracts and assume others. For an excellent article discussing the issue of the
severability of related contracts in the context of motions to assume and reject, see Jerald I.
Ancel, et al., All for One and One for All? The Assumption and Rejection of Multiple
Intertwined Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (1999).
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
88. For example, if the Chapter 11 petition was filed by a business with adequate
capitalization, then budgetary constraints and maximization of value may not be a
controlling concern. However, in a case where the business has filed for protection under
Chapter 11 because of financial distress, profitability and maximization of asset value will
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4. The Effect of Rejection Upon the Priority of Claims
As discussed supra, § 365(a) of the Code provides that a debtor-in-
possession may either assume or reject its executory contracts or unexpired
leases. 89On one hand, if the debtor-in-possession elects to assume the
contract or lease, then its pre-petition obligations under the contract or
lease become the obligations of the debtor-in-possession. As such, the
debtor-in-possession's obligations-or, stated differently, the rights of the
creditor-become administrative expenses of the estate.90 For a creditor, the
upshot of the characterization as an administrative expense is that
administrative expenses are granted first priority among unsecured
claims. 9' On the other hand, if the debtor-in-possession rejects the contract
or lease, "the non-debtor party to the contract has a claim against the debtor
for damages for the breach of the contract, which.., is deemed to have
arisen immediately before the filing of the petition and is a pre-petition
claim. 92
From the perspective of a creditor, a debtor-in-possession's decision
either to assume or reject an executory contract is of the utmost importance
because, in accordance with the fundamental policy of equitable
distribution to all similarly situated claimants, unsecured creditors share
proportionately in distributions.93  The result of this proportional
play a substantial role in the business' decisions within its reorganization.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
90. Section 503 of the Code defines administrative expenses as "the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for
services rendered after the commencement of the case." Id. at § 503(b)(1)(A).
91. Id. at § 507(a)(1).
92. In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 145 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). The statutory
mandate for this treatment is § 365(g), which provides:
(g)Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or
lease-
(I)If such contract or lease has not been assumed under this Section or under a
plan confirmed under Chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, immediately before
the date of the filing of the petition ....
11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123. Section 1123 mandates:
(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law, a plan
shall-
(1) designate, subject to section 1122 of this title, classes of claims, other
than claims of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1), 507(a)(2), or
507(a)(8) of this title, and classes of interests ....
(4) provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular
class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less
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distribution between claimants within the same class is that the claimants
are almost never paid in full:
[Although the creditor's] claims are calculated in full under state
law... , their actual relief, the payment of the claims, can be
thought of as being in little tiny Bankruptcy Dollars, which may
be worth only ten cents in U.S. dollars. In sharp contrast, if the
trustee assumes a contract, then it is converted into an estate
obligation, a post-petition obligation, and the ... [non-debtor
party] becomes entitled to full performance or payment as an
administrative claim. Because administrative claims are paid
first in any distribution, they are usually paid in full, 100-cent
U.S. dollars.94
Because rejection gives rise to a pre-petition claim against the debtor-
in-possession, it may not only severely prejudice a claimant's prospect of
full recovery under the plan of reorganization, but also trigger the operation
of § 502(b)(7) of the Code where it is an employment contract that is
rejected.95 § 502(b)(7) limits claims for damages resulting from a debtor-
in-possession's termination of employment contracts to "the compensation
provided by such contract, with acceleration, for one year following the
earlier of' the petition date or the "date on which the employer directed the
employee to terminate, or such employee terminated performance under
such contract plus... any unpaid compensation due under such contract,
without acceleration, on the earlier of such dates. 96
Notwithstanding the general principle that a creditor's claims arising
from a rejected contract will be considered a pre-petition claim against the
debtor-in-possession, a claimant can elevate its claim to that of an
administrative expense if the claimant can demonstrate that his or her claim
falls within the language of § 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code.97 Section 503
requires that an administrative expense must "be for services rendered in
'preserving the estate"' and that the claims must "be the 'actual, necessary
costs and expenses' of preserving the estate." 98 In the past several decades,
favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest ....
Id.
94. Westbrook, supra note 73, at 253.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7).
96. Id.
97. For the full text of the section, see supra text accompanying note 91. It is important
to note that the Code contains another source for priority of severance pay in § 507(a)(3),
which provides for a priority in respect of "allowed secured claims, but only to the extent of
$4,000 for each individual or corporation, as the case may be, earned within 90 days before
a the date of the filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business,
whichever occurs first." Id. at § 507(a)(3). This priority is limited, however, to the amount
of $4,000. It is, therefore, not surprising that the battleground with respect to the priority of
severance pay in bankruptcy lies in § 503.
98. In re Williams, 165 B.R. 840, 841 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993) (quoting 1I U.S.C. §
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courts have applied three different tests to determine whether an
employee's entitlement to severance benefits under a rejected employment
contract constitutes an administrative expense of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. The application of these different approaches, however, has resulted
in the disparate treatment of severance packages in business bankruptcies.
Accordingly, the next section of this article will discuss these different
approaches with particular emphasis upon their effect on the priority
afforded to severance packages in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
B. The Priority Afforded to Employee Claims for Severance Payments
As discussed supra, the nature of severance pay has been classified as
either compensation for loss of employment or as liquidated damages in the
event that the employment contract is terminated without cause.99 Indeed,
the priority of severance packages has often turned upon the nature of such
payments. If on the one hand, a court characterizes the termination clause
as a liquidated damages provision in the contract, then it is likely that the
court will classify the employee's entire severance package as a pre-
petition right to damages. As such, no portion of the severance payments
will be afforded administrative expense priority. 10o On the other hand, the
courts that have historically classified severance payments as compensation
have divided that compensation into one of two categories based upon
whether the payments were (1) intended to compensate for length of
service or (2) intended to compensate for lack of notice.' °
1. The Lack of Notice/Length of Service Dichotomy
A clear majority of cases decide the priority of an employee's
entitlement to an administrative expense priority for severance payments
due under a rejected employment contract based upon whether the
payments were compensation for the employee's length of service with the
business or whether the payments were intended to compensate the
employee for termination absent the requisite amount of notice specified in
503(b)(1)(A)).
99. See supra notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text.
100. In re Ad Serv. Engraving Co., 338 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1964); see also In re
Hooker Invs., Inc., 145 B.R. 138, 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that the
employee's claim for severance pay could not be afforded administrative expense priority
because the termination clause in the employment agreement at issue characterized the
payments as "damages").
101. See In re Health Maint. Found., 680 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982); Cramer v.
Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 955 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Pub. Ledger, 161 F.2d 762,
771-73 (3d Cir. 1947); In re Yarn Liquidation, Inc., 127 B.R. 544, 546 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1997); In re Miami Gen. Hosp., 89 B.R. 980, 984 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
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the contract. The two leading cases adopting this approach are the Third
Circuit's opinion in In re Public Ledger, Inc.'°2 and the First Circuit's
opinion in Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc.10 3 In re Public Ledger involved
the claims of two different groups of employees: members of the
Philadelphia Typographical Union (Union) and members of the Newspaper
Guild of Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey (Guild).'04 Both of these
parties asserted that their claims for severance pay were entitled to priority
after their former employer was declared bankrupt. 105  Whereas the
employment agreement entered into with the Union stipulated that "two
working days notice shall be given a situation holder before being laid
off,,' 0 6 the Guild's employment contract provided that the employee would
be entitled to "[t]wo weeks' pay if employed more than a total of six
months and less than one year" in the event that the employee was
discharged with cause.
10
7
In analyzing the Union members' claims for priority of their severance
pay under the Bankruptcy Act (Act), l0s the court concluded that "the
severance pay, in that it moves to all employees regardless of length of
service, is... wages wholly earned and accrued under the trustees'
management and, therefore, is entitled to priority as such."' 9 In contrast,
the court only afforded priority to the part of the severance pay entitled to
the Guild members that was "earned under the administration of the
trustee."'11 The Third Circuit reasoned:
[T]he discharge provision of the Guild contract relates to wages
and any sum received by the employee under it is a part of his
wage. Upon the conditions of the contract being met, money
earned each day of the service matures in time to the status of a
102. 161 F.2d at 762.
103. Cramer, 536 F.2d at 950.
104. In re Pub. Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d at 764.
105. Id. at 765, 769.
106. The Public Ledger court did not expressly state that the severance pay was
conditioned upon termination without notice. It is apparent, however, from the court's
opinion that this was indeed the case. See id. at 769-71. The Union employment agreement
also contained a provision providing two weeks vacation time with pay for "[e]mployees
who have... [been employed] ... during the entire previous year" and one day of vacation
time with pay "for each twenty-six days worked in the preceding calendar year" for all other
employees. Id. at 765.
107. Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. The case was decided under § 64(a)(2) of the Act, which provided that wages, not
to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months before the
date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to workmen [and] servants" are entitled
to priority. Repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2586
(1978).
109. In re Pub. Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d at 771 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 774. That is to say, the amount earned after the business was adjudicated a
bankrupt.
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due debt. Each claim, therefore, should be allowed its rightful
sum as a charge against the estate and that portion which was so
earned under the trustees' management should be given the
priority due to administrative expense[s]. I'
The Third Circuit's cryptic rationale in Public Ledger was adopted by
the First Circuit several decades later in In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.
112
While noting the Second Circuit's adherence to the "economic adjustment
and recompense approach,"1 3 the First Circuit agreed with the distinction
drawn by the Third Circuit in Public Ledger between severance pay
conditioned upon termination without notice and severance pay
conditioned upon an employee's length of service with the business.
1 4
When the debtor-in-possession has assumed an employment
contract providing that all discharged employees are entitled to
their salaries for a brief period following the discharge as
severance pay, the apparent consensus in the federal courts is that
the employee claims are entitled to ... [Section] 64(a)(1)
priority .... However, in cases like the one at bar, where only
those employees who have served for a certain period of time are
entitled to severance pay and where the amount thereof varies
with the length of service... the once conclusion that is
consistent with the objectives of ... [Section] 64(a)(1), Chapter
XI, and the Bankruptcy Act as a whole is that such claims are not
entitled to first priority in their entirety.., where no portion of
[the] ... [employees'] claims can be apportioned to their
employment after the arrangement has been filed, no portion of
the severance pay claims can be entitled to ... [Section] 64(a)(1)
priority. 15
The First Circuit premised its holding upon one of the underlying
policies of Chapter 11-the effective reorganization of the debtor-and noted
the importance of the continuation of goods supplied and services rendered
to the debtor-in-possession as a means of effectuating that goal.1 16 Section
64(a)(1), in the Mammoth Mart court's opinion, was Congress' method of
inducing parties to continue business with a debtor-in-possession.11 7 The
court opined, therefore, that to be entitled to the priority, "the debt must
111. Id. at 773.
112. Cramer, 536 F.2d at 955.
113. See discussion Part III B.2 infra.
114. 536 F.2d at 953.
115. Id. (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted). The court dropped a footnote to
explain that in the case subjudice the employees had only worked for a short period of time
after the petition date and that they had already received severance pay equal to their
entitlement. Id. at n.2. The court thus concluded that no other portion of their claims should
be entitled to priority. Id.
116. Id. at 954.
117. Id.
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arise from a transaction with the debtor-in-possession" and that the priority
only exists to "the extent... [which] the consideration supporting the
claimant's right to payment was both supplied to and beneficial to the
debtor-in-possession in the operation of the business. 1. 8 Accordingly, in a
case where all employees are to receive severance pay, the consideration
underlying the claim, i.e., being an employee in good standing at the time
of discharge, will have been supplied to the debtor-in-possession.19 In
contradistinction, in a case where the amount of severance pay depends
upon the length of employment, the consideration underlying the claim,
i.e., continued work for the entire period of employment, will have been• • 120
supplied to both the pre-petition business and the debtor-in-possession.
Consequently, and in accordance with the purposes of the priority, only the
portion of the claim that was supplied to and benefited the debtor-in-
possession should be afforded priority.
21
Based upon the holdings and rationale set forth by both the Public
Ledger and Mammoth Mart courts, the following rules have been ossified
into a rule of law to which this article will refer as the "Lack of
Notice/Length of Service Dichotomy." The rule first divides severance
packages into two general classifications: (1) pay at termination of
employment in lieu of notice and (2) pay at termination of employment
based upon length of service. If the employee's entitlement arises out of
the former, then courts are generally in agreement that it is entitled to
priority as a cost of the administration of the bankruptcy estate because the
claimant's entitlement to severance pay is contingent upon being an
employee at the time the debtor-in-possession terminates the contract.
Thus, the full consideration has been supplied to the debtor-in-
possession. 122 If, however, the employee's entitlement arises out of the
latter, then only the amount of severance that has accrued while the
business has been operating as a debtor-in-possession will be considered an
administrative expense because it is only that portion of the consideration
which has been supplied to the debtor-in-possession.1
21
118. Id.
119. Id. at 955.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See e.g., Wyle v. Pacific Maritime Assoc. (In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc.), 713 F.2d
476, 479 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Elliott Wholesale Grocery, 98 F. Supp. 1017, 1018-19 (C.D.
Cal. 1951); In re Levinson Steel Co., 117 B.R. 194, 196 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re
Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 89 B.R. 980, 988 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
123. See, e.g., In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 957-58 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Health
Maint. Found., 680 F.2d at 621; In re Russell Cave Co., 248 B.R. 301, 304-05 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. 2000); In re Demert & Dougherty, No. 96-B-00851, 1999 WL 1140859, at *4 (Bankr.
N.D. I11. Dec. 13, 1999); In re Yam Liquidation, Inc., 127 B.R. 544, 546 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1997); In re Old Electralloy Corp., 167 BR. at 795-96; In re U.S. Metalsource Corp., 163
B.R. at 271; Jeannette Corp. v. Gilardi (In re Jeannette Corp.), 118 B.R. 327, 329-30
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2. The Economic Readjustment and Recompense Approach
In contrast to those courts that have applied the lack of notice/length
of service dichotomy,124 some courts have taken a more liberal approach to
the priority which should be afforded to severance pay in the event that an
employer files a petition under Chapter 11. The leading case adopting this
approach is the Second Circuit's opinion in In re Straus-Duparquet, Inc.
2 5
The severance package in dispute provided that
those employees who have been in the employ of the company
one (1) year but under three (3) years, one (1) week's severance
pay [and that] those over three (3) years, two (2) weeks'
severance pay, provided, however, that they were discharged
through no fault of their own. Employees shall be paid at the
time of separation. 126
The court concluded that the claimants were entitled to priority under
the Act, reasoning that "[s]everance pay is 'a form of compensation for the
termination of the employment relation, for reasons other than the displaced
employees' misconduct, primarily to alleviate the consequent need for
economic readjustment, but also to recompense him for certain losses
attributable to the dismissal.'"1 27 Accordingly, the court held that because
"severance pay is compensation for termination" and because the
termination was "an incident of the administration of the bankruptcy
estate," the "severance pay was an expense of administration and is entitled
to priority as such an expense. 1 21 It is important to note that the Second
Circuit so concluded despite the fact that the severance payments were tied
to the length of the employees' service.
29
The rule of law adopted by the Straus-Duparquet court has been
followed not only by courts within the Second Circuit, 30 but also courts
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Allegheny Int'l Inc., 118 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1990); In re Levinson Steel Co., 117 B.R. at 196; In re N.W. Eng'g Co., 43 B.R. 603, 605
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984).
124. See supra Part. III. A.1.
125. 386 F.2d at 649.
126. Id. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 651 (quoting Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 120 A.2d 737, 740
(N.J. 1956)) (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 650, 651. The court, however, did hold that the vacation pay that accrued
based upon the employees' length of service was not entitled to priority, as it was earned
day to day and, thus, accrues throughout the employment relationship. Id. at 650.
130. See, e.g., Rodman v. Rinier (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 620 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding that severance pay was entitled to priority as an administrative expense
because of the "definition of severance pay as compensation for termination, as opposed to a
form of wages that accrues from day to day"); In re Unishops, Inc., 553 F.2d 305, 308 (2d
Cir. 1977) (allowing administrative expense priority for the severance package due to the
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outside the Circuit. For example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana concluded that an executive vice-president of
the debtor corporation was entitled to administrative expense priority for
his claims arising from a severance package within his employment
agreement. The court noted that the issue was one of first impression
within the Fifth Circuit and, after addressing both the lack of notice/length
of service dichotomy and the economic readjustment and recompense
approach, agreed with the Second Circuit.13 2 The Campo Electronics court
supported its conclusion that the severance payments should be afforded
priority as an administrative expense with what it opined to be an important
policy consideration:
[S]uch agreements are offered to employees of financially
troubled companies as an incentive not to leave. Companies
faced with financial problems and/or impending bankruptcy must
have the authority to enter into enforceable severance agreements
with key employees. If severance pay is denied priority status,
this incentive will be lessened.
33
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina adopted the economic readjustment and recompense approach
because of fairness considerations.' 34
Courts both within and outside of the Second Circuit have adopted the
debtor's chief executive officer); Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 55
B.R. 735, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Where the termination occurs during the bankruptcy
proceeding, the termination pay is a cost of business activity occurring during that
proceeding, and so is an administrative expense."); In re Crystal Apparel, Inc., 220 B.R.
816, 835 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The [Second Circuit] cases have held that if the debtor
in possession continues the employment of a worker after the filing date and then terminates
the worker, the worker has an expense of administration claim for the entirety of the
severance pay available under company policy."); In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 193
B.R. 400, 407 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[The debtor-in-possession] received the benefits of
[the claimant's] expertise and services during the administration of the estate.... [T]he
value of the benefits conferred included the indirect compensation of severance payments
which.., is intended to compensate employees for the hardships attributable to termination
and is when the employee is dismissed.").
131. In re Campo Elecs., Inc., 247 B.R. 646, 651-52 (E.D. La. 1998).
132. Id. at 651.
133. Id.
134. In re Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc., 136 B.R. 410, 414 (D.S.C. 1992). The
court reasoned:
Loyal employees who have remained and will remain on the job need to be assured that
should the debtors [sic] reorganization efforts require areas of service to be streamlined and
employees discharged, the discharged employees will be treated fairly and in accordance
with the same policy provisions under which they initially agreed to be employed and under
which they have remained with the debtor companies through this period of financial strife.
Id. For another case outside the Second Circuit that has adopted the economic readjustment
and recompense approach, see In re St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Inc., 86 B.R. 606, 606
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988).
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economic readjustment and recompense approach and support its viability
with sound policy concerns; nevertheless, the approach has also been
criticized with respect to the outcomes achieved via its application. 3 5 In In
re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, 36 the court purported to reject the
economic readjustment and recompense approach espoused by the Second
Circuit in Straus-Duparquet, relying heavily upon a discussion of the
doctrine of stare decisis in In re Hooker Investments, Inc.13 7 The In re
Ralph Lauren Womenswear court noted that courts within the Second
Circuit had begun to move away from the precedent set forth in Straus-
Duparquet not by expressly rejecting it, but instead by consistently
narrowing its scope in application.'38 In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear,
however, did not altogether reject the underlying rationale of Straus-
Duparquet, but rather limited the priority afforded the employee's claim to
a quantum meruit basis.
39
The In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear court was indeed correct that
several courts have distinguished Straus-Duparquet from the cases pending
before them. The issue of whether those courts were merely drawing
legitimate distinctions or were affirmatively acting to limit the application
of the economic readjustment and recompense approach is debatable. For
example, in Hooker Investments, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York discussed why the precedential value of the Straus-
Duparquet decision either has been greatly diminished or is non-existent.
40
First, the court noted that Straus-Duparquet was decided under the former
Act and that several post-Code developments have called the tenets upon
which the decision was based into question. For example, the Hooker
135. Most of the cases adopting the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy, expressly
rejected the economic readjustment and recompense approach that has been adopted by the
Second Circuit. See supra Part III. B. 1.
136. 197B.R.at771.
137. Id. at 775-76. See In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 145 B.R. 138, 146-47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992); see also infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing the In re Hooker Invs.
opinion).
138. In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, 197 B.R. at 776 (citing In re Hooker Invs., 145
B.R. at 150).
139. Id. at 777-78. Indeed, the court agreed with the Straus-Duparquet line of cases in
stating that the severance package was intended to constitute compensation for loss of
employment:
As an employee who was earning a very substantial salary, Kreisler [the
claimant] obviously was going to suffer a greater pecuniary loss than someone
who was making less money. Consequently, it is not surprising that the
severance agreement he negotiated with the debtors was as generous as it
was.... Here the severance benefit agreed to by the parties was not based upon
some enormous figure pulled from thin air. Rather, it was an attempt to
approximate Kreisler's total salary for year ....
Id. at 777.
140. 145 BR. at 146.
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Investments court stated that the Code brought with it the "limitation on the
allowability of claims arising from the rejection of employment
agreements.'' Another important development, in the opinion of the
Hooker Investments court, was the enactment of § 1113 of the Code.
142
Further, the court noted the importance of §§ 365(d)(3) and 1114 of the
Code, which mandate that the pre-rejection amount paid landlords be the
rent reserved in the lease 14 and that certain insurance benefits must be paid
to retirees, respectively.'" All of these factors, in addition to the court's
conclusion that the Second Circuit has "hinted that it might be prepared to
reconsider" its earlier decisions adopting the economic adjustment and
recompense approach, held that the doctrine of stare decisis did not
command its adherence to the Straus-Duparquet line of cases.1
4 5
141. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (1994)). For a discussion of § 502(b)(7), see supra
note 96 and accompanying text.
142. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113). For a discussion of § 1113 of the Code, see supra
notes 62-70 and accompanying text).
143. See 1 U.S.C. § 1114.
144. In re Hooker Invs., 145 B.R. at 146; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
145. 145 B.R. at 147 (citing Trustees of the Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc.,
789 F.2d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1986)). It is important to note, however, that the Hooker Invs.
court denied administrative expense priority based upon the fact that the employment
contract designated the severance packages as "damages." Id. at 147-48. See also supra
note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a judicial characterization that
severance packages are a form of liquidation damages clause in an employment agreement
would have upon the priority afforded to the employee's claim).
It is important to note, as well, that the Hooker Invs. court's statement, as to the
Second Circuit's intimation in McFarlin's that it may be prepared to revisit the Straus-
Duparquet line of cases, may have been hyperbolic, in that the Second Circuit expressly
reaffirmed its adherence to Straus-Duparquet in its McFarlin's opinion:
Our decision is not inconsistent with cases holding a bankrupt's obligation to
pay severance pay, which arises out of the termination of an employee during
bankruptcy is an administrative expense entitled to priority. These decisions
rest on the basis that severance pay is compensation for the hardship which all
employees, regardless of their length of service, suffer when they are terminated
and that it is therefore "earned" when the employees are dismissed.
Accordingly, it is granted a first priority as a cost of doing business during the
bankruptcy proceeding.
McFarlin 's, Inc., 789 F.2d at 104 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit's holding in McFarlin's, Inc. that the employee's claim was not
entitled to an administrative expense priority was premised upon the fact that the claim in
the nature of withdrawal liability was made under an ERISA-qualified plan. Id. The crux of
the court's opinion, therefore, was not the rejection of the economic readjustment and
recompense approach adopted by Straus-Duparquet, but rather the manner in which
withdrawal liability is earned-day to day, as opposed to the date upon which the employee
is discharged. See id. Similarly, the other courts within the Second Circuit that have not
found Straus-Duparquet to be controlling have premised their opinions upon the fact that
the employee's entitlement was not in the nature of severance. For example, bankruptcy
courts in both In re Crystal Apparel, Inc and In re Child World, Inc, held that the
employees' claims were not administrative expenses because the entitlements under their
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Another court has limited the Straus-Duparquet holding in its
application to "golden parachutes. 146 In In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc., Cohen, a former general counsel of the financial services
company, averred that he was entitled to over five million dollars in
severance payments pursuant to his employment contract and that such
payments were entitled to priority as administrative expenses of the
bankruptcy estate. 147 Cohen's employment contract provided for a general
severance payment, which included "all accrued but unpaid amounts of
Base Salary and Annual Bonuses to the date of... termination" in the
event that his employment was terminated "other than due to Disability or
for Cause."'148 Moreover, the agreement contained a provision entitled
"Special Severance Payment," which entitled Cohen to
a lump sum payment equal to the sum of the total cash
compensation, including Base Salary and Annual Bonuses,
which, if [Cohen's] employment had not been terminated, would
have been payable to [Cohen] by [Debtor] and DBL during the
period commencing with the termination of [Cohen's]
employment and ending on the fourth anniversary of the
Commencement Date.
149
In addition, the language of the employment agreement indicated that
it was entered into with the prospect that the company might subsequently
become insolvent or declare bankruptcy. 5 ° In such an event, Cohen would
be entitled to the "Special Severance Payment" even if he decided to leave
the company. 5 ' Near the one-year anniversary of the "Commencement
Date," and after the company had filed under Chapter 11, the president of
the company informed Cohen that he would be terminated "because, with
the change in the nature of Drexel's operations, Cohen was no longer
respective employment agreements were not "severance pay." In re Crystal Apparel, Inc.
220 B.R. at 853 (reasoning that entitlement was not severance pay because it was not based
upon length of service and because the amount of which was indirectly proportional to the
amount of time the claimant was employed); In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R at 853
(concluding that claim was not severance pay because the entitlement was not based upon
length of service).
146. See In re Drexel Bumham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 687 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992). For a general discussion of "golden parachutes," see supra text
accompanying note 17.
147. 138 B.R. at 690.
148. Id. at 692-93.
149. Id. (alterations in original). The employment relationship was one for a specific
term of four years. Id. at 691. "Commencement Date" was a defined term within the
employment contract and referred to the date upon which Cohen was to begin employment
with the company. Id.
150. Id. at 693.
151. Id. This provision had little influence upon the court's ultimate decision, however,
as the right to the payments is much different from the right to an administrative expense
priority in their full amount.
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needed to perform the functions contemplated by the Employment
Agreement.'
52
Cohen argued that "the Special Severance Payment provided an
inducement to join [the company], in the prime of his professional career at
a time when he had a flourishing law practice" and that it "was a shield to
protect [him] from unwarranted action by [the debtor]'s tainted
management."' s3 The court incisively noted that Cohen had perhaps made
the best argument against a conclusion that his claim should be afforded an
administrative expense priority, as this statement, taken in conjunction with
his citation to McFarlin's, "devastate[d] his position.1 54 Cohen cited to the
following language in McFarlin's to support his claim:
[A]n expense is administrative only if it arises out of a
transaction between the creditor and the bankrupt's trustee or
debtor-in-possession, and "only to the extent that the
consideration supporting the claimant's right to payment was
both supplied to and beneficial to the debtor-in-possession in the
operation of the business.' 55
The court, however, concluded that both the transaction and the
beneficial consideration-as per Cohen's statement-were supplied pre-
petition. 5 6  Thus, the court found that Cohen's claim to the "Special
Severance Payment" was not an expense incurred in the administration of
the debtor-in-possession's bankruptcy estate.1
57
152. Id. at 691.
153. Id. at 713 (alterations in original have been omitted) (third and fourth alterations in
original) (first alteration added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at712-13.
155. Id. (quoting McFarlin's, Inc. 789 F.2d at 101).
156. Id. at713.
157. The court, however, did hold that his claim for payments under the general
severance provision was entitled to an administrative expense priority. See supra note 148
and accompanying text; Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. at 711. Based
upon the court's holding in regard to the "Special Severance Payment," the reader would
expect that Cohen not have been entitled to an administrative expense priority with respect
to the general severance payment as well, or, in the alternative, that the only portion of the
general severance payment entitled to priority as an administrative expense would be that
portion which was earned from the petition date to the date upon which Cohen's termination
became effective. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. The court's rationale for
this extraordinary conclusion could be an important tool for labor and employment
practitioners engaged in the representation of executive-level employees in contract
negotiations with current or prospective employers. One component of Cohen's
compensation package was a group of four stock portfolios purchased by Cohen for $100
each, but, when assembled by the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, were valued at
$500,000 each at the time of purchase. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 138 BR.
at 692. The bond portfolios matured successively upon the each anniversary of the
"Commencement Date" for the four-year span of employment. Id. These portfolios were
placed into escrow by Cohen, whose agent was instructed, under the employment
agreement, to release the portfolios to Cohen upon their respective maturity dates. Id.
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Notwithstanding the criticisms of the economic readjustment and
recompense approach, it has yet to be overruled. Accordingly, Straus-
Duparquet and its progeny remain a viable approach for determining the
priority afforded to severance packages.
3. The Uly-Pack Approach
In In re Uly-Pak, Inc.,'18 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Illinois expressly repudiated the lack of notice/length
of service dichotomy in favor of a more flexible approach.'59 In re Uly-Pak
involved a claim for severance pay under an employment contract which
provided that if the claimant was terminated for any reason other than
willful misconduct, he would receive either his salary for the term of the
contract or a lump sum payment equal to 300% of his annual salary.160 The
claimant's employer filed its Chapter 11 petition approximately two years
after the claimant entered into the employment agreement, and a month
after the petition date, the claimant was terminated. 161
In its analysis of whether the claimant was entitled to an
administrative expense priority for the severance payments due under his
employment contract, the court acknowledged that the lack of notice/length
of service dichotomy "has become ossified into a rule of law" and that
"[f]ower courts now tend to apply the rule blindly, placing severance pay
into one of the two categories while ignoring the rationale underlying the
distinction."' 162 The In re Uly-Pak court noted that, although the lack of
notice/length of service dichotomy may be a workable standard where the
severance payments are clearly compensation either for discharge without
the requisite amount of notice provided for in the employment contract or
based upon length of service, the approach must be rejected because it does
"not exhaust all possible types of severance pay.' 63  Consequently, the
Uly-Pak court opined that the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy
forces courts to place severance payments into "artificial categories" to
In reaching its conclusion with respect to Cohen's entitlement to the portfolios, the
court noted that "under New York law[, legal title to property placed in escrow remains
with the grantor until the occurrence of the condition specified in the escrow agreement."
Id. at 710 (citations omitted). The upshot, for Cohen at least, is that because it was he,
rather than the company who placed the portfolios into escrow, the portfolios did not
become property of the estate under § 541(a) of the Code and, instead, will become his
property outright as they vest. See id. at 710-11.
158. In re Uly-Pak, Inc., 128 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
159. Id. at 767-68.
160. Id. at 764.
161. Id. Between the petition date and the date upon which the claimant was discharged,
the Chapter 11 was converted to a Chapter 7. Id.
162. Id. at 767.
163. Id. at 767-68.
20021
66 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 5:1
which the payments would not otherwise belong.164 Indeed, the severance
package before the Uly-Pak court did not fit into either category because
"[n]owhere in the contractual provision is notice mentioned" and "[tihere
was no vesting provision; by its terms, the severance pay provision became
effective when the contract was signed."'
65
Therefore, the court looked to the statutory definition of an
"administrative expense," as set forth by the Seventh Circuit and concluded
that to be afforded an administrative expense priority, the severance
payment must "(1) arise[] from a transaction with the debtor in possession
and (2)... [be] beneficial to the debtor in possession in the operation of the
business." 166  Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, "the determinative
factor is not when the right to payment matured but, rather, when it was
earned.,, 16' The court then concluded that the employee's claim should be
denied priority as an administrative expense, reasoning that the "severance
pay neither arose from a transaction with the debtor in possession nor
benefited the debtor in possession in the operation of the business because
the severance pay was "earned" when he entered into the employment
agreement.1 68  To support this conclusion, the court noted that if the
employee had been terminated pre-petition, he would still have been
entitled to the entire amount of the severance package provided for in the
employment agreement. 161
164. Id. at 768. For examples of cases supporting the accuracy of this statement, see In
re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the district court
observed that the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy was imperfect because the
payments due to the employee were due regardless of eligibility or length of service);
Dullanty v. Selectors, Inc. (In re Selectors, Inc.), 85 B.R. 843, 846 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)
(encountering difficulty arriving at a conclusion under the lack of notice/length of service
dichotomy because the severance payments were not "'pay at termination based upon length
of employment," and, "just as clearly ... not 'pay at termination in lieu of notice"'); In re
Crystal Apparel, Inc., 220 B.R. 816, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to classify the
employee's entitlement as "severance pay" simply because it was not based upon length of
service); In re Child World, Inc., 147 BR. 847, 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that
the contractual provision did not provide for "severance pay" because, under Massachusetts
law, severance pay is usually based upon length of service); In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 145
B.R. 138, 149-50 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that the payments did "not have the
typical characteristics of severance pay" because the amount to which the employee was
entitled was inversely proportional to length of employment).
165. In re Uly-Pak, Inc., 128 B.R. at 768; see also In re M Group, Inc., 268 B.R. 896
(Bankr. Del. 2001).
166. Id. at 766 (citing In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1984)).
167. Id. (citing In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 75 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1987)).
168. Id.
169. Id. But see In re Artesian Indus., Inc., 183 B.R. 496, 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)
(disagreeing with this proposition and reasoning that "[i]f the claimant had "earned" his
severance pay pre-petition, which was before he was terminated, he should have been
entitled to receive the severance pay if he left the company prior to being terminated").
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The Uly-Pak decision eschewed the distinctions upon which many
prior cases addressing severance packages in bankruptcy rested, yet, at the
same time, it reinforced the rationale underlying those distinctions. Uly-
Pak "trimmed the fat," so to speak, from these decisions to uncover their
common denominator: the two-prong test for an administrative expense
priority.17  And so, it is with that observation that the focus of this Article
will shift into a critical discussion of these different approaches.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Flexibility and Equity in Judicial Application
Each approach taken in an attempt to ascertain the priority afforded to
severance packages in the event of a business bankruptcy has focused upon
170. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (setting forth the two-prong test for
determining whether a claim is entitled to an administrative expense priority under §§ 503
and 507 of the Code). A similar approach was recently adopted by the Tenth Circuit in
Bachman v. Commercial Fin, Servs., Inc. (In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.), 246 F.3d
1291 (10th Cir. 2001) and applied by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware in In re M Group, Inc., 268 B.R at 896. The crux of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
Commercial Financial Services was that the claimants' right to severance was not a result of
transaction entered into with the debtor because "[in determining administrative priority,
courts look to 'when the acts giving rise to a liability took place, not when they accrued."'
Bachman, 246 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Sunarhauserman, Inc.,
126 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 1997)). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that "[tihe liability arose at
the time the contracts where executed," which the court distinguished from the time at
which the right to payment arose-upon termination of the employment relationship post-
petition-and thus, held that no portion of the claimants' severance packages were entitled
to priority. Id. (citing Isaac v. Temex Energy, Inc. (In re Amarex, Inc.), 853 F.2d 1526,
1530 (10th Cir. 1988)).
There, however, are problems with the Tenth Circuit's reasoning as a consequence of
its reliance upon the First Circuit's opinion in Cramer, 536 F.2d. at 950. See supra notes
113-122 and accompanying text (discussing Cramer). The most obvious problem is seen
when one compares a statement by the First Circuit in Cramer. to the facts of In re
Commercial Financial Services. In Cramer, the First Circuit opined that "[lff an
employment contract provides that all discharged employees will receive severance pay
equal to their salaries for a specified period ... the former employees will be entitled to
priority." In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d at 955 (citing In re Public Ledger, 161 F.2d
at 769-71) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit stated the facts of In re Commercial
Financial Services as follows: "Appellants Bachman and Phelps entered into employment
contracts with CFS in which both employees were promised lump sum cash payments upon
termination by CFS prior to the expiration of the contracts unless such termination was for
cause. The lump sum payments equaled appellants' annual base salaries of $120,000 and
$150,000, respectively." In re Commercial Fin. Servs., 246 F.3d at 1292-93 (emphasis
added). Thus, Commercial Financial Services is essentially the fact pattern under which the
First Circuit stated it would allow an administrative expense priority to the employee.
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whether the consideration underlying the payments was conferred upon the
debtor-in-possession and whether that consideration benefited the debtor-
in-possession in the operation of its business.' 71 Specifically, with respect
to the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy, the First Circuit stated in
In re Mammoth Mart that "the priority will depend upon the extent to
which the consideration supporting the claim was supplied during the
reorganization.' 72 The distinction between severance payments made in
lieu of notice or based upon length of service may be a useful shorthand for
determining whether the payment should be afforded priority as an
administrative expense, but the difference between the two categories is
superfluous and, in some cases, quite misleading. 7 Furthermore, the crux
of the economic readjustment and recompense approach is the
determination that the termination of the employee was incident to the
administration of the estate.1 74  Three conclusions are implicit in that
statement. First, although the contract may have been entered into with the
debtor pre-petition, the transaction triggering the employee's right to
severance pay was the termination of the employment contract by the
debtor-in-possession. Second, the employee's entitlement to severance
payments under the employment contract is supported entirely by post-
petition consideration, i.e., the consideration put forth for the payments by
the employees is merely that the employees would be employees in good
standing on the date of termination and that the discharges were without
cause. And, third, the employee's discharge benefited the debtor-in-
possession in the operation of its business.
Indeed, in their most basic sense, both the lack of notice/length of
service dichotomy and the economic recompense and readjustment turn
upon the same test. Thus, it is the recommendation of this article that
courts following both approaches should eschew these semantic
distinctions in favor of the simple approach advocated by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois in In re Uly Pak,
Inc. 175
However, the solution to the issue of whether severance packages
should be afforded a priority as an expense incurred in the administration
of the debtor-in-possession's bankruptcy estate is not that simple. The
primary reason for this difficulty is the problematic aspects of the
application of this test. The first prong of the test advocated in Uly-Pak is a
171. See infra Part V.
172. In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d at 955.
173. See supra text accompanying note 164 (discussing the problematic results of the
lack of notice/length of service dichotomy in situations where the payments are dependent
upon neither condition).
174. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
court's adopting the economic readjustment and recompense approach).
175. See supra notes 166 and accompanying text (discussing the Uly-Pak approach).
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determination that the transaction was entered into with the debtor-in-
possession.176 If a court applying the Uly-Pak test finds that the transaction
was indeed entered into with the debtor-in-possession, then the court must
determine not only whether the consideration was supplied to the debtor-in-
possession, but also whether the consideration benefited the debtor-in-
possession in the operation of its business. As the underlying principles
behind all three approaches are the same, it necessarily follows that the true
distinction between the approaches is in their application of those
principles. Moreover, because the approaches are somewhat result-
oriented, it is perhaps easiest to work backwards, gleaning the courts'
reasoning from their conclusions.
On the one hand, those courts applying the lack of notice/length of
service dichotomy have found that (1) severance packages based upon lack
of notice are to be afforded administrative expense priority and (2)
severance packages based upon length of service are entitled to an
administrative expense priority only to the extent that they were earned
post-petition.1 77 Thus, there are several implicit conclusions within the
holdings of these respective courts. First, and most importantly, because a
portion of the payments were entitled to an administrative expense priority,
it can be surmised that these courts reasoned that the transaction was
indeed entered into with the debtor-in-possession.17 8 Without this initial
conclusion, the court could not afford any portion of the severance pay
priority as an administrative expense. Second, because these courts viewed
payments tied to length of service as pre-petition claims, but allowed
priority to the amount of the claim that was either earned or accrued post-
petition if the severance payments were in lieu of notice, it can be assumed
that these courts concluded that the consideration for the employment could
be supplied to the debtor-possession and that the debtor-in-possession
could derive a benefit from that consideration in the operation of its
business.7 9 The conclusion follows, therefore, that these courts viewed the
consideration in these employment contracts to be the employee's standing
within the business at the time of termination, in that if the employee's
entitlement to severance pay was tied to length of service, the
consideration, i.e., the amount of time the debtor served the business, was
supplied to both the business as it existed pre-petition and to the post-
petition debtor. Conversely, if the employee's entitlement to severance pay
is based upon the failure of the business to give the requisite amount of
notice prior to termination, then the consideration, i.e., the fact that the
employee was still employed by the company on the date of termination,
176. See id.
177. See supra Part IV.B.I.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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was supplied to the debtor-in-possession where the employee was
terminated post-petition. Thus, according to the courts that have followed
the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy, where the consideration is
supplied to the debtor-in-possession, it will necessarily follow that the
amount of that consideration will benefit the debtor.
On the other hand, courts adopting the economic readjustment and
recompense approach have concluded that severance packages are entitled
to an administrative expense priority, regardless of the conditions to which
the employee's right is tied. 8° From this conclusion, it necessarily follows
that these courts opine that the claim arises from a transaction with the
debtor-in-possession. Moreover, these courts expressly put forth several
different lines of reasoning as to how the debtor-in-possession was
benefited.' 8' The important aspect of this reasoning, however, is that it
demonstrates the different manner in which the test for administrative
expense priority is applied by courts espousing the two different
approaches. Antithetical to the courts applying the lack of notice/length of
service dichotomy, in which there is a benefit to the debtor-in-possession in
the amount of the consideration furnished to it, the courts following the
economic readjustment and recompense approach appear to reason that
there is consideration furnished to the debtor-in-possession where the
debtor-in-possession benefits from the termination. This distinction, albeit
minute, accounts for the different conclusions under each approach.
Although the approach adopted by the Uly-Pak court' 82 is the most
efficient, in that it provides a uniform test for determining whether an
employee's claim for severance pay should be afforded an administrative
expense priority, the conclusion reached by the court in its application of
the approach' 83 is problematic in several respects. First, it leads to not only
a rule, but also a conclusion that is the exact converse of the lack of
notice/length of service dichotomy. By focusing upon when the right to
payment was "earned," rather than when the right to payment "matured,"
the Uly-Pak rationale would lead to the conclusion that any severance
package connected to neither length of service nor lack of notice would be
denied an administrative expense priority because the right to payment was
earned upon the consummation of the employment agreement. In contrast,
severance packages tied to the length of the employee's service would be
entitled to priority as an expense of administration to the extent that the
employee "earned" the payments after the commencement of the Chapter
11 case.
180. See supra Part III.B.2.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 131 and 134, and note 135 and accompanying
text.
182. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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An example of this rule in practice demonstrates the inequitable result
it produces. Employee A entered into an employment contract with the X
Corporation on December 1, 2001. Employee A's contract provided for
two weeks salary, which would amount to $2400, for every six months in
which she was employed by the corporation in the event that she was
terminated "without cause." Employee B entered into an employment
contract on the same date as Employee A. Employee B's contract,
however, provided that he would be entitled to a lump-sum payment of
$2400, which would equal two weeks salary, in the event that he was
terminated "without cause." X Corporation filed a Chapter 11 petition on
April 1, 2002, but both A and B remained with the corporation after that
date. On May 1, 2002, X Corporation, Debtor-in-Possession, was
permitted by the bankruptcy court to reject its employment contracts with
both A and B. Consequently, both A and B filed their respective proofs of
claim against the estate.
If the bankruptcy court charged with the administration of X
Corporation's bankruptcy estate strictly followed the Uly-Pak decision,
then Employee A would be entitled to an administrative expense priority in
the amount of $400, which would equal the amount of severance pay
earned while X Corporation was a debtor-in-possession, and a pre-petition,
unsecured claim of $5600, which would represent the amount of severance
pay she earned prior to X Corporation's operation as a debtor-in-
possession. Employee B, however, would be entitled to the same total
amount as Employee A, $6000, but none of that claim would be afforded
an administrative expense priority because Employee B "earned" the
severance on December 1, 2001. This would be the proper outcome under
Uly-Pack notwithstanding the fact that both A and B conferred the same
benefit upon the X Corporation, Debtor-in-Possession. The same inequity
would result from the application of the lack of notice/length of service
dichotomy if Employee B's severance was designated as severance "in lieu
of notice." Only in that situation, Employee B would receive the entire
amount as an administrative expense priority, whereas Employee A would
still only be entitled to the priority in the amount of $400.
According to Uly-Pak, the distinction is that Employee B could have
received the entire amount even if he was terminated the day after the
employee contract became effective and before the corporation filed under
Chapter 11. This fact, however, is irrelevant as it relates to the issue of
whether the transaction was entered into with the debtor-in-possession or
whether the consideration was supplied to the corporation post-petition, as
this article asserts that the consideration put forth by both employees is not
their standing as of the date of termination, but instead the work they
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perform for the corporation.84 This conclusion is consonant with the
termination provisions of most employment contracts that continued
employment is conditioned upon the employee's fitness for that
employment. For example, if the employee fails to meet certain
enumerated employment-related goals, then discharge will be "for cause"
pursuant to the employment agreement. Similarly, this fitness can be
affected by the employee's unlawful activity outside the workplace. Thus,
to the extent that the employee rendered services to the debtor-in-
possession and to the extent that the debtor-in-possession benefited from
those services, the employee should be entitled to an administrative
expense priority in that amount. This conclusion would be the most
consonant not only with the policies underlying Chapter 11 reorganization,
but also the purposes of severance packages.
B. The Policies Underlying Chapter 11 Reorganization
Although the most overt purpose of Chapter 11 is the effective
reorganization of the debtor, there is a coequal purpose of equitable
distribution to creditors. 85  Allowing all severance payments to be
administrative expenses could be viewed as manifestly unjust, not only to
the debtor-in-possession who must pay these claims in full, but also to the
unsecured creditors, who are likely to receive less under the plan as a
result. To add to this inequity, the claims of some of those creditors will
have likely arisen in the same manner as the payments due to the claimant-
employee-based upon a pre-petition contract that was rejected. Whereas
the third-party creditors would only receive priority in the amount of the
goods or services provided to the debtor-in-possession, the claimant-
employee, under the economic readjustment and recompense approach,
would receive the entire amount of the claim as an administrative expense.
It is important to note, however, that-unlike suppliers of goods and
services, whose sources of income are often diversified such that they are
not wholly dependent upon the debtor company-the sole source of income
for many employees is their salary. This distinction is reflected in the
limited priority granted in § 507(a)(3) of the Code. Since 1994, Congress
has twice increased the amount of this priority to its present amount of
$4,650, thereby expressing its intention to allow a limited inequity between
employee severance claims and the claims of goods and service providers.
When one examines the opposite end of the spectrum, it is apparent
that following the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy or the Uly-
Pak decision would hinder the reorganization process, as there would be no
184. See sources cited supra note 15 (stating that severance pay "is a remuneration for
the service provided during the period covered by the agreement").
185. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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incentive for employees to remain with the debtor-in-possession as it
struggles through the Chapter 11 process. Likewise, businesses that are in
poor financial condition, but have yet to file bankruptcy, will have a more
difficult time attracting the employees who have the expertise to help those
businesses recover.
186
The Uly-Pak two-prong test applied such that the consideration
provided to the debtor-in-possession is the work performed by the
employee, would achieve a balance between the concerns that plague
analysis under the other two approaches by entitling the employee-claimant
to an administrative expense priority as to the percentage of the severance
package which accrued post-petition. Further, the employee-claimant
would possess a second, albeit limited, priority claim under § 507(a)(3).
18 7
In addition, this approach would provide employees with some incentive to
remain with companies in poor financial positions and, more importantly,
during the reorganization process. Admittedly, this approach undermines
the degree of financial protection provided by severance packages outside
of bankruptcy. Because the application of the economic readjustment and
recompense approach would certainly allow the employee-claimant to
receive that to which he or she should be entitled considering that one of
the purposes of severance packages is to protect the employee from
economic hardship due to termination of employment for circumstances
beyond his or her control.18 Such a conclusion, however, would result in
an inequity of distribution between third-party contract claimants and
employee-claimants beyond that which Congress envisioned and,
accordingly addressed in § 507(a)(3). Likewise, the lack of notice/length
of service dichotomy would lead to similar inequities amongst the
employee-claimants.
Thus, in balancing the fairness to similarly situated claimants, the
application of the two-pronged general administrative expense priority
test-with the employee's services to the business viewed as the
consideration underlying the employment contract-would provide the most
equitable result. Under such an approach, all similarly situated employee-
claimants would receive the same pro-rata amount of their severance
payments regardless of the terminology or maturity conditions of the
termination clauses within their respective employment contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the approach advocated by this article, the claimant-employees
will receive a lesser degree of protection than they would otherwise be
186. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
187. See supra text accompanying note 98.
188. See supra notes 7 and 16 (discussing the purposes of severance packages).
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provided under either the economic readjustment and recompense approach
or the lack of notice/length of service dichotomy in certain circumstances.
Bankruptcy law, however, is a delicate, and oftentimes awkward, balancing
act, and thus, courts must consider the equities of their decisions with
respect to all parties involved. The approach this article espouses is not
only the most equitable with respect to the debtor-in-possession and all of
its creditors, but also the most efficient with respect to judicial economy.
Notwithstanding the critical nature of this article, its goal was to
provide a broad overview of the employment-related issues that can arise in
the context of the administration of a Chapter 11 case, as well as a detailed
discussion of the treatment of severance packages within a Chapter 11 case.
Admittedly, this article has raised more questions than it has answered.
However, with respect to the subject matter of this article, perhaps it is
enough merely to raise these questions, as the answers will most likely be
supplied by the courts called upon to resolve these conflicts.
